AFOVA New Letter 2 of Year 2021

Section 7 – Panorama CV 2 No. 02 / 2021 Page 227 of 332 3 What Happened in Dacca on 16 December 1971 — as drawn from a post written on 16 December 2016 Mr K S Nair Genre: Flashback – A Victorious Event years ago on this day, 16 December 1971, India was seeking to bring to a close its swift, effective military campaign in the former East Pakistan, while leaving no opportunity for the military victory, and the sacrifice of some 2,500 lives, to be negotiated away in a diplomatic or political “settlement”. On the Eastern Front, Indian troops were now on the very point of entry into Dacca, from several different directions. They had captured several towns on the way, mostly communications centres; but had also bypassed others, leaving garrisons of Pakistani troops isolated and with paralysed communications. This was thanks partly to some intelligent staff work at Eastern Command, which had calculated (sometimes against the advice of more cautious generals) that there was no point in attempting to occupy every town on the way; there were enough Bangladeshi freedom fighters to keep Pakistani troops penned up in their cantonments. And it was also partly thanks to the daring, imaginative way in which some Indian line commanders, in particular Lt Gen Sagat Singh, GOC of IV Corps, had exploited unexpected successes, and kept up the momentum of advance. There remained perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 Pakistani troops in Dacca, plus a few thousand more who had abandoned other positions and streamed into the city. This, in the built-up environment of a sizeable city, would have been enough to mount a fairly extended resistance, should they have chosen to fight, street by street and house-to- house. Urban warfare is one of the most unpleasant forms of combat, and inevitably results in civilian casualties (as has been seen in recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria). It is no disgrace to the Indian Army that they wanted to avoid it if possible. The Pakistan Air Force had virtually ceased to operate, certainly by day, since around 6 December. The Pakistan Navy’s strength in the Eastern theatre, consisting of a number of gunboats and one US-provided submarine, had been sunk at sea or crippled in port. There was no possibility of any military turnaround — except for the risk that Pakistani leadership would continue to fight in the hope of a bailout by China or the United States. The larger risk was the mounting pressure on India at the United Nations (UN), to suspend military operations. 45