AFVOA Newletters of Year 2004

Page 15 of 153 Sinkiang in 1958. 54. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have been claiming the Siachin wasteland as their territory and engaged in grabbing the more advantageous position along the line. In early eighties Karakoram ranges became special destination for many western Army expeditions. Subsequently, this area came to be shown as part of Pakistan in the maps issued by western countries. This alerted India. Pakistan claims that Siachin is part of country’s northern areas. It says that this area has remained under its administrative control since 1947. 55. India’s contention is that this undemarcated area was never under the control of Pakistan and cites Shimla agreement as a proof. The 78 km long Siachin glacier is hemmed in between the Saltoro ridge line to the west and the main Karakoram range to the east. The Saltoro ridge originates from the Sia Kangri in the Karakoram range and the altitudes range from 18,000 to 24,000 ft. The major passes on this ridge are Sia La at 20,000 ft and Bila Fond La at 19,000 ft. India’s position on Line of Control is based on the terrain configuration, which runs along the Saltoro ridge line upto Sia Kangri. Pakistan claims that the Line of Control is a straight line joining NJ9842 to Karakoram pass north of the Indian Dault Bag Ouldi outpost. The Pakistani claim does not relate to the accepted principles of frontier demarcation. It cuts across the river valleys Nubra and Shyok of Indian Ladakh, 10,000 sq km of Indian territory, which includes Siachen glacier. 56. Presently India holds two-thirds of glacier and commands two of the three passes. Pakistan controls Gyong La pass that overlooks the Shyok and Nubra river Valley and India’s access to Leh district. Indian imperatives are that if Pakistan is allowed to control the glacier, it would endanger the security of Ladakh and also of J&K. With Chinese already in control of Aksai Chin, it is argued that the whole of northern Ladakh would be imperilled if Pakistan is allowed unfettered movement through Siachen. In long-term perspective, Indian strategists also feel that this Himalayan watershed can yield it access to resource rich Central Asian republics through the Afghan panhandle. Through its control of the glacier, Pakistan intends not only to threaten Leh-Ladakh but also to take her border to meet that of China. It believes then it can find an alternate route to the treacherous Karakoram highway. On the face of it, Pakistan argument looks simply ridiculous. Indian occupation of Siachen can hardly threaten Sino-Pak Karakoram highway, as the highway is nearly 200 km of broken mountainous terrain away from Siachen. 57. Of and on Pakistan activates Siachen prior to any formal talks with India and links Siachen to the Kashmir issue. Its purpose being to focus the ‘core’ issue of Kashmir. By making key Siachen as a potential flash point, especially now in a nuclearised environment, it seeks third party intervention in its favour. CONFRONTATION 58. By the beginning of 1984, Pakistani plans for occupying Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier were ready. India pre-empted this by launching Operation Meghdoot in April 1984. An advance unit from Kumaon Regiment was airlifted, which established Indian posts on Siachen. India gained control of the two passes Sia La and Bilfond La, which overlook the strategic Karakoram highway. Pakistan vainly tried to recapture these passes in late 1984 and 1985. 59. In 1986, Pakistani army received another setback. In an extraordinary act of valour and skill, Subedar Bana Singh captured 21,000 ft high Qaid Post from Pakistanis. India renamed the post as Bana Post and this earned Bana Singh India’s first and only Param Vir