AFOVA New Letter 2 of Year 2021

Section 5 – War Diary CV 2 No. 02 / 2021 Page 86 of 332 maintained, as the enemy was likely to resort to a pre-emptive strike at any time. The initiative lies with him, how long and when he would resort to it, only the history would tell. However, he minced no words to state that "He would like, if the war came, a short, crisp and a decisive battle." He wished all, GOOD LUCK. 2 Dec 71 Quite unmindful of the prevailing situation on our borders, arrived the Air Headquarters Team, headed by Air Cdre VM BHATNAGAR, to assess the requirements and make fresh recommendations for the establishment of a CARE AND MAINTENANCE UNIT. The Base Cdr in his opening address highlighted the role of these forward bases during operations and strongly recommended that these be turned into full time Mini Wings with full manpower, communication, MT and associated facilities. This he said, would yield dividends during operations. The Impressions gained after the conference were that this revision was more likely to be downwards than upwards. 3 Dec 71 At about 1800 hrs besides the normal happenings of the day came the flash call from Air Cmde KANWAR SINGH AOC RAJASTHAN informing PAKISTAN'S pre-emptive strikes on our airfields, followed by a Command call and a Radio announcement. This Station was already geared up and was expecting such a pre-emptive strike to take place any time from 2 nd of December. All actions were initiated, and available forces asked to standby and undertake offensive actions on receipt of word “SANSAR”. The day light had already gone past when the word "SANSAR” was received. The receipt of the word was promptly acknowledged. Total black out measures were already in force for the past 15 days. The Ground Defence and the Air Defence were more than alert. The night was spent in waiting but the enemy did not show up. 4 Dec 71 The Station launched five command task missions (2 aircraft each) on targets such as JACOBABAD AIRFIELD, RAHIMYARKHAN RADAR and AIRFIELD. In addition, close support sorties were carried out in the area where 12 Inf Div was expected to launch an offensive enabling them to capture SAKHIREWALA and ISLAMGARH. When 12 Inf Div was concentrating on their area of advance towards RAHIMYAR KHAN, the enemy sneaked in with one Regt of Armour and one Bde strength troops from GHABBAR via BP 638 towards LAUNGEWALA. The leading column of tanks by—passed LAUNGEWALA post and was seen advancing towards RAMGARH, past midnight. This suspected movement, as identification was not possible, was passed by the Coy Cdr at LAUNGEWALA to the HQ. This did cause certain doubts in the Div HQ, but the same appeared to be discarded. The column of tanks decided to turn about a few kilometres short of RAMGARH, when they found their rear not catching up. This was the first fatal mistake committed by the enemy which subsequently changed the course of war. Had these tanks carried on, they would have easily over run RAMGARH, as there were no defences whatsoever. Return of these leading tanks towards LAUNGEWALA and the noise of more tanks rolling in compelled the Coy Cdr to apprise GOC 12 Inf Div again. On receipt of this message the GOC tried to get through to the Base Cdr, but to